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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD MICHAEL BROWN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10759 
The Defendant in this action was charged with 
Second Degree Burglary of an automobile of one Ron-
ald L. Call. The case was tried before a Jury and a 
verdict of guilty returned by the Jury. At the trial, the 
principal witness, Ronald L. Call, testified regarding 
the facts surrounding the alleged burglary and during 
direct examination was permitted over counsel for De-
fendant's objection, to testify regarding the prior loca-
tion of certain items of personal property. (TR. of 
Trial p. 14). The Court permitted Ronald L. Call to 
testify to the conclusions of fact to be proved which 
were the ultimate issue. 
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At the conclusion of the evidence the Court in-
structed the Jury. The counsel for Defendant prepared 
an instruction on the recent possession of stolen property 
which was rejected by the Court and an exception duly 
taken by counsel for the Defendant. (TR. of Trial 
p. 25). 
On the 15th day of July, 1966, the Defendant was 
sentenced by the Honorable Maurice Harding. The 
Court denied the Defendant probation on the ground 
that Defendant had items of personal property in his 
automobile at the time of the arrest and therefore the 
Court concluded he had committed burglaries on many 
other occasions. (TR. of pronouncement of Judgment 
p. 3) 
From the verdict of the Jury and the Judgment 
entered therein, and from the sentence of the trial court, 
the Appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment and 
verdict and the granting of a new trial or that failing 
that the sentence should be declared void. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMIT-
TING THE TESTIMONY OF RONALD L. 
CALL TO THE CONCLUSION OF FACT TO 
BE PROVED. 
The State called as its principal witness at the 
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trial of this case Ronald L. Call. The State on direct 
examination of said witness asked (TR. of Trial p. 4). 
"Where did he get those to hand them back 
to you?" 
Before the witness answered, counsel for Defendant 
objected and over his objection the witness Ronald L. 
Call answered, 
"Out of my car." 
The somewhat narrow question on appeal under 
this assignment of error is whether or not it was proper 
for the trial judge to permit Ronald L. Call to testify 
and state his opinion as to the ultimate issue. The loca-
tion of the items of personal property raised at least 
inferentially, the unlawful entry upon which the case 
turns. 
A substantial number of courts have gone far 
enough to rule out a witness's views as to how the Judge 
and jury should exercise their function and have an-
nounced the general doctrine that witnesses will not be 
permitted to give their opinions or conclusions upon an 
ultimate fact in issue.1 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has ex-
amined this problem and in the case of State vs. Carr, et 
al stated the majority position and its reasoning: 
"As a rule the witness is required to state facts 
he observed and relied on as the basis of his opin-
ion so far as they permit of a detailed enumera-
tion. Such a statement of the facts affords an 
1 State vs. Carr, 196 N.C. 129, 144 S.E. 698. 
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opportunity of testing the reasonableness of his 
in~e~ence, ~or ~ witness may not express an 
opm1on which fmds no support in the facts he 
enumerates." 
The reason is sometimes stated that such testimonv 
if admitted invades the province of the J ury.2 The co~­
cern is not that the expressions be taken literally by the 
Jury but that if admitted will encourage the Jury to 
forego independent analysis of the facts and bow too 
:readily to the remarks made by the witness. 
The answer solicited by the prosecutor called for 
an opinion of a mixed question of law and fact. When 
a standard has been fixed by law, the entry in a burglary 
prosecution, no witness should be permitted to express 
an opinion as to whether or not the person or conduct 
measures up to that standard. On that question the 
Court must instruct as to the law and the Jury be 
permitted to draw its own conclusion from the evidence) 
The dangers of permitting such statements are 
obvious. At the trial of any criminal action the Jury is 
required to pass upon the credibility of the State's wit-
nesses. If the principal witness, who generally also is the 
victim is entitled to express the ultimate issue to be 
proved, the Jury might be far more impressed by that 
testimony than any of the other evidence offered in the 
case. Having heard the victim state the ultimate issue, 
what else need they hear? 
2 DeGroat vs. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247 N.W. 69. 
3 Federal Underwriters Exchange vs. Cost, 132 Texas 299, 123 
s.w. 2d 332, 334, 335. 
4 
The Defendant submits that to permit this prin-
cipal witness to testify to the ultimate issue, and to 
admit this improper evidence was reversible error on 
the part of the trial judge. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO 
GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUC-
TION ON RECENT POSSESSION OF STO-
LEN PROPERTY IS ERROR. 
The defendant requested that the Court give the 
following instruction and the same was denied by the 
trial judge. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
No. I 
In order to presume that the Defendant was 
guilty of burglary as charged in the information, 
you may consider the fact that the Defendant was 
in recent possession of stolen property. However, 
you must determine that the possession is suffi-
ciently recent as to exclude every other reasonable 
hypothesis for said possession. In making this 
determination you must also find, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the possession was personal, 
exclusive, and knowledgeable in the Defendant. 
You are further instructed that you cannot 
convict the Defendant solely upon his possession 
of said property, but you must consider the pos-
session with other facts or circumstances tending 
to connect the Defendant with the unlawful entry 
into the vehicle of Ronald Leroy Call as the law 
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in Utah is that the mere bare possession when 
not coupled with other culpatory or incriminat· 
ing ~ir~umstances does not suffice to justify a 
conviction. 
Further you are instructed that if only the 
cri~e of larceny is inferred by virtue of the pos-
session of stolen property from a burglarious 
entry, this also does not suffice to warrant a con-
viction and you must, therefore, find the Def en-
dant not guilty. 
The law in Utah regarding recent possession ap-
pears to be relatively clear.4 There may or may not have 
been corroborating circumstances in the case at bar. 
However, the Appellant submits that the offense of 
burglary is ordinarily removed one degree further from 
the act of larceny and the possession of stolen goods 
does not have the same tendency to connect the Appel-
lant with burglary as it would with larceny. 
Appellant therefore was entitled to have his cau-
tionary instruction on recent possession. Without same 
the Jury was entitled to conclude that by virtue of the 
possession the entry was made. Appellant contends that 
the Court should have instructed that possession was to 
be considered as any other factual circumstance in arriv-
ing at its conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
Appellant. It seems to be established that recent pos· 
session of stolen property by itself will not suffice to 
sustain a conviction. The possession must be considered 
along with other facts and/ or circumstances which tend 
4 State vs. Crawford, 59 U. 39, 201 P. 1030. 
State vs. Kimsey, 77 U. 348, 295 P. 247. 
state vs. Nichols, 106 U. 104, 145 P.2d 802. 
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to suggest involvement on the part of the Appellant with 
an unlawful entry. 
Appellant contends that the Court's failure to 
give his instruction was prejudicial as it influenced the 
Jury's determination in that it was not fair and im-
partial. Refusal to grant the instruction denied to Ap-
pellant the law applicable to his theory of the case. 
The Appellant was entitled to have his instruction 
given as to recent possession of stolen property if sup-
ported by any evidence regardless of however weak, in-
sufficient, or doubtf'ul in credibility it may be.5 
It should be immaterial that the uncontradicted 
facts would put little weight in the instruction if given. 
All issues should be fairly and clearly stated to the Jury 
and the failure to instruct upon this issue was reversible 
error on the part of the trial judge. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO 
GRANT THE DEFENDANT PROBATION 
ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD COM-
MITED BURGLARIES ON MANY OTHER 
OCCASIONS AND REQUIRED HIM TO TES-
TIFY AGAINST HIMSELF CONSTITUTES 
ERROR. 
Title 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides that: 
5 Gibson vs. State, 89 Ala. 121, 8 So. 93. 
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_"Upon a plea.?~ guilty or conviction of any 
crnne or offense, if it appears compatible with the 
public interes_t, the ~-ourt having jurisdiction may 
suspend the 11npos1t10n or the execution of sen-
tence, and may place the Defendant on probation 
for such period of time as the Court shall de-
termine." 
The statute contemplates that if it is compatible 
with the public interest a Defendant convicted of a 
crime may be placed on probation, and it vests in the 
trial judge's discretionary power to determine whether 
or not it is compatible with the public interest that the 
Defendant be placed on probation. 
The exercise of any such discretion must be upon 
a sound and proper basis. The court in this case in sen-
tencing the Defendant Brown ref used the Defendant 
probation and based this refusal largely upon the fact 
that the Defendant had various personal property and 
tools in his automobile. 
The Court said: 
"You have probably been around commit-
ting burglaries and prowling on cars for a long 
time. If you would have told us the truth, 
you would likely have been doing t_hat for_a long 
time. You had your car loaded with eqmpment 
with which to do those things." (TR Pronounce-
ment of Judgment, p. 3.) 
This Court speaking in the Siebert case6 concluded 
that an arbitrary denial of probation based upon irrel-
6 State vs. Siebert, 6 U.2d 198, 310 P.2d 388. 
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evant and improper considerations resulting in an abuse 
of direction by the trial judge would permit review of 
his actions. 
Unfortunately the record below neglects to disclose 
the circumstances under which the information as to the 
contents of the car come into possession of the Court or 
the probation department. However, it is apparent from 
the comments by the Judge that he relied heavily upon 
same in making his determination as to the granting 
or denial of probation for this Defendant. 
The various hearings with respect to the Defendant 
disclose that this information was never given voluntar-
ily but rather was in the possession of the probation and 
Parole Department at the time of sentencing (TR. of 
Hearing p. 3.) The contents of the car were fully in-
ventoried at the time of Defendant's arrest without 
warrant while the Defendant was in custody. Arising 
out of said search of the Defendant's car, was a charge 
against this def endant7 for violation of section 32-7-31 
U.C.A. 1953. The only record relative to the search and 
seizure is by reference to a minute entry in the City 
Court of Provo City, County of Utah, State of Utah, 
and what one might ascertain from the Transcript of 
Hearing held on July 29, 1966. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
This case came on regularly for trial with a jury 
this 19th day of May, 1966. Arnold C. Roylance, Utah 
7 Preston vs. United States, 376 U.S. 364. 
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County Attorney, present in Court for plaintiff. Defen-
dant present in Court with his counsel, Robert Van 
Seiver. On roll call all jurors were present. The Court 
administered the oath to the jurors. At the request of 
counsel for Defendant, all jurors were excused, and Mr. 
Van Seiver moved the Court to dismiss the Complaint 
because of unlawful Search and Seizure. Motion denied. 
Jurors returned. Both parties are ready to proceed. The 
following were empanelled tn try this case: 1. Dale 
Wall; 2. Margaret Orvil; 3. Vilate Olson, and 4. Mary 
Frost. Arnold C. Roylance made his opening statement. 
Counsel for Defendant reserved his opening statement 
until later. Robert Henry 'Valz, D 1105 John Hall, 
B.Y.U. (4900 Cherry Street, Vancouver, Washington) 
sworn and testified for Plaintiff. Richard Michael 
Lopez, D 1102 John Hall, B.Y.U. (512 East Haltern, 
Glendora, California) sworn and testified for Plaintiff. 
Mr. Walz called on rebuttal. James Earl Lindsay, 
B.Y.U. Security Officer, sworn and testified for Plain-
tiff. At the request of counsel for Defendant, all jurors 
were excused from the Courtroom, and he moved for a 
dismissal because of unlawful Search and Seizure. 
Motion taken under advisement, and Court in recess 
until 2 :00 p.m. Court in session at 2 :30 p.m. All jurors 
"\Vere present and were dismissed by the Court. After 
deliberation, the Court grants the motion of counsel for 
the Defendant, and this case is dismissed. By order of 
the Court, the evidence is released from the custody of 
the B.Y.U. Security Officers into the Custody of the 
City Clerk. 
Appellant contends that use of the evidence ob· 
tained by this search violated Appellant's constitutional 
rights.8 
s U.S. Const. Amend., 4 Utah Const. Art. 1, Sec. 14. 
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And the case law construing same as the evidence 
which is directly seized during an illegal search cannot 
ever be admissable.9 The receipt of such inadmissable 
evidence and its subsequent use was clearly an abuse of 
the trial judge's discretion in making a determination 
as to probation. Ample case authority exists that the 
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are available at 
all stages of the trial. lo 
It should also be noted that the Defendant in order 
to avail himself of the guarantees afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment was required to waive the guarantees of 
the Fifth Amendment.11 The requiring of Appellant to 
waive one guarantee to invoke the other cannot be sus-
tained as it clearly unvails the guarantees intended in 
both Amendments. 
The search of Defendant's automobile was not 
material to the prosecution for burglary. What was dis-
closed by the search of Defendant's automobile was 
material to sentencing on the burglary. To permit the 
trial court to use this evidence under the circumstances 
by which it was obtained against the Defendant is to 
permit the State to avail itself of knowledge which it 
otherwise would not have had. 
In order to constitute a waiver of either amendment 
it must be clearly shown that such waiver was voluntary 
9 Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U.S. 385; Weeks 
vs. U.S., 232 U.S. 383. 
lo Saferick vs. U.S., 62 F.2d 892. 
11 U.S. Const. Amend , 5 Utah Const., Art. 1, Sec. 12. 
11 
and free from coercion or duress. What could be less 
voluntary than the circumstances under which waiver 
was made by this Defendant? Not waiving the rights 
afforded by either Amendment and still going to prison? 
Further in the hearing (TR. of Hearing p. 28) 
after asking Counsel to admit the Defendant's guilt, the 
Court required the Defendant to testify against himself 
or go to prison, the Court commented, (TR. of Hearing 
p. 28): 
"It makes a difference to the Court whether or 
not the Defendant recognizes any wrongdoing. 
When a person asks for leniency we like to be 
advised as to whether or not he is J.i\epentant. If a 
man does not repent, I am not ready to release 
h. " rm. 
If this reasoning of the Court is sound, and is a 
valid basis for the exercising of the Court's discretion, 
then a Defendant in a criminal action must decide after 
he is convicted whether to confess guilt to the Court and 
probation authorities, or face the denial of probation 
and be committed to the penitentiary. The Defendant 
cannot move for a new trial, or appeal his conviction 
until after he has been sentenced, and under the theory 
of the trial court in this case, unless he admits this guilt 
after a verdict of guilty he cannot have probation. If he 
were to confess guilt in order to retain his right of proba-
tion, and he was granted a new trial, the officials of the 
probation department could appear as witnesses against 
him. Thus the effect of the Court's reasoning in this case 
is to force the Defendant to either testify against him-
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self, or have probation denied him. Such a requirement 
would certainly violate the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States and would be a de-
privation of any Defendant's rights. It places on the 
Defendant a burden which is repugnant to our system 
of law. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Appellant respectfully contends that the trial 
judge in permitting the testimony of Ronald L. Call 
as to the ultimate issue, committed reversible and pre-
judicial error and that the trial judge's refusal to give 
the Defendant's requested instruction denied the Appel-
lant the law applicable to his theory of the case, and that 
denying Defendant probation based upon the items in 
his car and refusal to admit guilt, showed that it based 
its exercise of discretion on an erroneous legal theory 
which, if permitted, would require this Defendant to 
testify against himself, and deny him the protection of 
the Constitution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOM 
By Robert Van Seiver 
Attorney for Defendant-Appelhtnt 
661 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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